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Resumo		Muitos	acadêmicos	e	analistas	afirmaram	que	o	multiculturalismo	falhou	e	o	culparam	 por	 promover	 a	 radicalização	 nas	 sociedades	 pluralistas.	 Tais	análises	 parecem,	 no	 entanto,	 simplistas.	 Outras	 dinâmicas,	 como	 a	aceleração	social	e	a	erosão	das	garantias	sociais,	estão	por	trás	dos	fatos	em	questão.	 O	 artigo	 discute	 o	 significado	 da	 radicalização	 e	 o	 processo	 de	“ideologização	 das	 culturas”,	 destacando	 que	 uma	 “armadilha	 identitária”	pode	ser	encontrada	nas	versões	simplificadas	do	multiculturalismo	e	até	no	interculturalismo	e	nas	novas	ideologias	nacionalistas.	Em	seguida,	discute	a	ideia	 de	 localizar	 e	 proceduralizar	 conflitos,	 combinando	 uma	 abordagem	jurídica	 do	 pluralismo	 com	 um	 necessário	 enfoque	 político.	 O	 valor	 do	pluralismo	 só	 pode	 ser	 afirmado	 por	 mediação	 e	 "levando	 a	 sério"	 as	demandas	 dos	 atores	 sociais.	 Articular	 essas	 afirmações	 em	 termos	 de	"política	 da	 diferença"	 é	 uma	 jogada	 perdida.	 Ao	 mesmo	 tempo,	 essa	abordagem	conseguiu	revelar	os	limites	do	universalismo	moderno.	No	nível	teórico,	nossos	esforços	devem	basear-se	no	trabalho	de	longa	data	realizado	por	teorias	críticas	na	teoria	geral	e	feminista	em	particular,	buscando	tornar	o	universalismo	mais	inclusivo.	De	fato,	tal	concepção	de	universalismo,	que	toma	 forma	e	conteúdo	da	multiplicidade	de	 lutas	e	é	concebida	como	algo	em	constantemente	 formação,	pode	 inspirar	não	apenas	a	 luta	por	direitos,	mas	 também	 a	 ação	 política	 que,	 em	 vez	 de	 se	 dividir	 em	 múltiplas	demandas	baseadas	 em	 identidade,	 identifica	os	objetivos	 comuns	 a	 serem	perseguidos.	
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Re	I	Between	“us”	and	“others”	
		
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	12(1):61-77	 62	
Palavras-chave:	Multiculturalismo,	Radicalismo,	Populismo,	Supremacia	do	Direito.	
	
Abstract	Many	 scholars	 and	 analysts	 stated	 that	 multiculturalism	 failed	 and	blamed	 it	 for	 fostering	 radicalization	 in	 pluralist	 societies.	 Such	analyses	 seem	 however	 to	 be	 simplistic.	 Other	 dynamics,	 such	 as	social	 acceleration	 and	 the	 erosion	 of	 social	 securities	 are	 in	 fact	 at	work.	 The	 article	 discusses	 the	 meaning	 of	 radicalization	 and	 the	process	 of	 the	 “ideologization	 of	 cultures”,	 highlighting	 that	 an	“identity	 trap”	 can	 be	 found	 in	 both	 simplified	 versions	 of	multiculturalism	 and	 even	 interculturalism	 and	 in	 new	 nationalist	ideologies.	It	then	discusses	the	idea	of	localizing	and	proceduralizing	conflicts,	 matching	 such	 a	 legal	 approach	 to	 pluralism	 with	 a	necessary	 political	 one.	 The	 value	 of	 pluralism	 can	 in	 fact	 only	 be	affirmed	 by	 mediating	 and	 ‘taking	 seriously’	 the	 demands	 of	 social	actors.	To	articulate	such	claims	in	terms	of	“politics	of	difference”	is	a	losing	 move.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 approach	 has	 succeeded	 in	revealing	the	limits	of	modern	universalism.	On	the	theoretical	 level,	our	 efforts	 should	 build	 on	 the	 longstanding	 work	 carried	 out	 by	critical	theories	in	general	and	feminist	theory	in	particular	to	seek	to	render	 universalism	 more	 inclusive.	 Indeed,	 such	 a	 conception	 of	universalism,	which	takes	shape	and	content	from	the	multiplicity	of	struggles	and	is	conceived	as	constantly	forming	can	inspire	not	only	the	 struggle	 for	 rights	 but	 also	 political	 action	 which,	 instead	 of	breaking	 apart	 into	 multiple	 identity-based	 demands,	 identifies	 the	common	objectives	to	be	pursued.	
Keywords:	Multiculturalism,	Radicalization,	Populism,	Rule	of	Law.	
	
Introduction:	The	‘other’	that	is	not	us2		 European	 societies	have	 always	been	plural.	As	 is	well	 known,	 the	very	 construction	of	the	 modern	 European	 state	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 relationship	between	 minorities	 and	 'indigenous'	 majorities.3	 A	 long,	 conflict-ridden	 process	 led	 to	 the	invention	 of	 national	 communities.	 (See	 Gellner,	 1983)	 In	 many	 cases,	 the	 “image”	 of	 the	nation	(See	Anderson,	1991)	has	been	forged	over	the	centuries	and	partly	in	opposition	to	an	equally	 fictitiously	 ‘elsewhere’	 conceived	 as	 a	 cohesive	 unit:	 the	 “East.”	 (See	 Said,	 1978)	Britishness	cannot	be	understood	without	referring	to	the	English	colonial	Empire,	nor	can	we	
																																								 																				2	I	would	like	to	thank	Rosaria	Pirosa	and	Emilio	Santoro	for	reading	and	commenting	on	this	text.	I	am	also	grateful	to	Ginevra	Cerrina	 Feroni	who,	 as	 the	 principal	 investigator	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Florence	 strategic	 project	 "Tools,	 paths	 and	 integration	strategies	in	multicultural	societies",	gave	me	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	research	and	in	so	doing	to	reflect	on	the	issues	addressed	 in	 this	 paper.	 In	 fact,	 this	 article	 re-engages	 and	 develops	 some	 of	 the	 considerations	 raised	 in	my	 essay	 entitled	“Integrazione	e	società	multiculturali:	le	sfide”	(Re,	2018,	p.	117-127).	3	This	first	reference	is	obviously	to	Hobbes'	Leviathan,	understood	as	a	response	to	the	English	civil	war.	
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comprehend	the	grandeur	of	the	République	without	recalling	the	ethnocentric	logic	of	French	liberal	 universalism	 that	 accompanied	 colonial	 expansion	 from	 the	 outset,	 attributing	 a	special	kind	of	humanité	to	the	citoyen.	(See	Todorov,	1993)4	‘Elsewhere’	evokes	not	only	the	‘other’,	 the	 'Oriental'(Said,	 1978)	 or	 'Negro'	 (See	 for	 example	 Mbembe,	 2018)	 born	 to	 be	dominated	in	the	colony,	but	also	the	'internal	enemy':	the	'Oriental'	living	within	the	territory	of	the	state	but	outside	the	'national	culture'	-	the	'gypsy'	or	'Jew'	-	or	the	'Negro'	working	in	plantations	 or	 houses,	 born	 'here'	 but	 hailing	 from	 another	 world.	 In	 fact,	 this	 opposition	between	'us'	and	'others'	can	be	found	in	European	nationalisms	but	also	in	the	construction	of	the	American	nation,	founded	on	the	myth	of	the	frontier	and	precise	lines	dividing	up	the	citizenry	on	the	basis	of	 'color.'5	Finally,	the	same	opposition	appears	in	the	history	of	many	Central	and	South	American	states	whose	political,	legal	and	social	systems	have	been	formed	by	distinguishing	between	natives	and	citizens	of	European	origins.6	As	postcolonial	studies	scholars	have	made	clear,	 the	consequences	of	these	historical	processes	did	not	 fade	out	 in	late	 modernity.	 In	 reality,	 they	 have	 left	 a	 legacy	 that	 is	 still	 fully	 operative	 in	 both	contemporary	democracies	and	geopolitical	relations	between	the	global	North	and	South.	Liberal	 democracy	 has	 a	 “solar	 body”	 and	 a	 “nocturnal	 body,”	 (Mbembe,	 2018,	 p.	 22)	remnants	 of	 a	 violent	 genesis	 disguised	 by	 the	 original	 myths	 of	 isonomy	 and	 self-government.	 The	 colonial	 system,	 slavery	 and	patriarchy	have	 contributed	decisively	 to	 the	development	 of	 modern	 capitalist	 societies,	 leaving	 in	 their	 wake	 this	 “bitter	 sediment.”	(Mbembe,	2018,	p.	20)	Liberal	democracies,	born	as	 "communities	of	 separation"	 (Mbembe,	2018,	 p.	 17),	 were	 based	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 those	 who	 were	 included	 within	 the	"sacred	 space"	 delimiting	 the	 chosen	 people	 making	 up	 the	 "community	 of	 the	 free"	 (See	Losurdo,	2005,	p.	264-274	and	ch.	8),	and	those	destined	to	remain	outside:	the	'non-free',	i.e.	slaves,	 women,	 the	 poor,	 prisoners,	 the	 mentally	 ill,	 the	 disabled,	 etc.,	 populations	 living	within	the	territory	of	the	state	but	excluded	from	the	social	pact,	and	the	'barbarians',	i.e.	the	colonized,	kept	outside	the	confines	of	the	metropolis	and	relegated	to	the	status	of	subjects.	Although	 the	political	and	social	 conflicts	characterizing	modernity	have	gradually	admitted	new	social	categories	to	the	"sacred	space,"	the	separation	has	never	entirely	disappeared.	It	is	a	division	that	conditions	the	mechanism	of	democratic	citizenship	(Zolo,	1999;	and	also	the	classic	 Marshall,	 1950)	 and	 has	 enabled	 "institutionalizing	 a	 regime	 of	 inequality	 on	 a	planetary	scale."	(Mbembe,	2018,	p.	20)7		
The	Multiculturalism	of	“others”		 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 globalization	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 European	countries	opened	 their	doors	 to	 immigration	 fed	 the	pluralism	of	national	societies,	altering	some	balances	 that	 had	 appeared	 to	 be	 stable.	 After	 an	 initial	 phase	 in	which	 the	 northern	European	 states	 encouraged	 immigration	 from	 the	 continent’s	 southern	 countries	 (Italy,	Spain,	Portugal),	 the	 focus	shifted	to	attracting	 labor	 from	northern	Africa,	Turkey	or,	 in	the	
																																								 																				4	I	have	tried	to	highlight	the	"ethnocentric	universalism"	of	a	current	of	French	liberal	thought	by	analyzing	the	colonial	writings	of	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	(see	Re,	2012).	5	The	theme	was	brought	to	light	by	Critical	Race	Theory.	See	for	example:	Crenshaw	et	al.	(1995).	For	an	anthology	in	Italian	by	a	number	of	authors	working	in	this	field,	see	Thomas,	Zanetti	(2005).	See	also	the	numerous	works	of	W.E.B.	Du	Bois.	Read	today,	some	analyses	of	the	plantation	system	cannot	help	but	bring	to	mind	European	and,	in	particular,	Italian	cases	as	well,	namely	the	systematic	exploitation	of	 foreigners	 in	agricultural	production.	See	for	 instance	ADIR.	L’altro	diritto	(2019).	Other	sources	include	Prandi	(2018)	and	Sciurba	(2015).	6	Regarding	this	point,	see	for	instance	Clavero	(2007,	p.	443-466).	7	Once	again,	Mbembe’s	analysis	must	be	supplemented	with	the	point	that	this	inequality	also	includes	institutionalized	gender	inequality	within	a	heteronormative	system.	
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case	of	England,	the	former	Asian	colonies.	The	initial	project	of	welcoming	foreigners	only	for	short	periods	thanks	to	“guest-	worker”	policies	–	laboring	bodies	borrowed	temporarily	to	be	sent	 home	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 work	 was	 finished	 –	 eventually	 failed.	 At	 that	 point	 the	 major	European	States	had	to	manage	the	domestic	presence	of	the	former	subjects	of	their	colonial	possessions,	that	is,	the	subjects-objects8	that	centuries	of	culture	and	colonial	law,	supported	by	widely	shared	racist	ideologies,	had	constructed	as	inferiors.9	Migration	and	the	processes	of	 building	 the	 new	 post-colonial	 order	 thus	 intertwined,	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	 complex	 debate	about	 the	 legal	 status	 and	 ‘integration’	 of	 these	 ‘newcomers’.	 Even	 in	 countries	 in	 which	immigration	 is	 a	 more	 recent	 phenomenon,	 racialization	 and	 ethnicization	 have	 played	 a	significant	role	in	both	public	debate	and	the	direction	of	migration	and	'integration'	policies.	(See	 Rattansi,	 2011)10	 It	 is	 in	 this	 framework	 that	 we	 find	 the	 European	 discussion	 on	multiculturalism	and	 the	move	 to	 import	 the	dispute	 between	 liberals	 and	 communitarians	(Ferrara,	1992)	(a	debate	which	has	been	running	through	North	American	philosophical	and	political	discussion	since	the	1980s	and	throughout	the	90s)	to	this	side	of	the	Atlantic.	As	 scholars	have	 recognized,	multiculturalism	was	developed	 in	Canada	with	 the	 initial	aim	 of	 establishing	 a	 pact	 of	 coexistence	 that	 was	 respectful	 of	 the	 linguistic	 and	 religious	differences	 characterizing	 the	 country’s	 two	 main	 communities:	 French	 Canadians	 and	 the	English-speaking	majority.	Only	later	was	it	formalized	in	legal-institutional	terms	as	a	model	for	recognizing	the	linguistic,	religious	and	cultural	identities	of	minority	groups,	before	then	being	 extended	 to	 the	minority	 populations	 that	 had	 formed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 immigration.	 In	Europe,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 multiculturalism	 was	 immediately	 linked	 to	 the	 problem	 of	‘integrating’	immigrants	and	in	particular	immigrants	considered	‘non-white’	and	Muslim	and,	by	virtue	of	this	status,	perceived	as	a	threat.	The	various	European	countries	adopted	different	policies	to	'integrate’	foreigners.	Some	such	 as	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 Sweden	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 followed	 models	 more	 closely	resembling	North	American-derived	multiculturalism,	at	 least	until	 the	2000s	and	each	with	its	 own	 trajectory.	 Others	 instead	 opted	 for	 assimilation	 policies,11	 while	 still	 others	 chose	hybrid	 forms	 granting	 the	 partial	 recognition	 of	 cultural	 rights.12	 Importing	 the	 North	American	 debate	 on	 multiculturalism	 into	 Europe	 in	 both	 its	 academic	 and	 mass	 mediatic	versions	does	not	seem	to	have	favored	harmonization	among	the	various	European	policies	for	 the	 ‘integration’	 of	 immigrants.13	 Rather,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s	 and	 in	 the	 2000s,	 the	opposition	 between	 liberals	 and	 communitarians	 was	 reproduced	 in	 the	 European	 debate,	both	 to	 criticize	 the	 systems	 inspired	 by	 multiculturalism,	 which	 ended	 up	 being	progressively	undermined	(See	Rattansi,	2018),	and	to	entirely	reject	this	approach,	casting	it	as	incompatible	with	the	liberal	tradition	of	European	constitutional	states.	However,	it	seems	that	 this	 discussion,	 in	 particular	 the	 simplified	 version	 used	 to	 translate	 it	 in	 the	 political	debate,	was	mainly	aimed	at	shifting	public	attention,	away	from	the	problems	of	social	justice	exacerbated	by	the	neoliberal	policies	adopted	in	many	European	countries	and	towards	the	problem	 of	 managing	 'ethnic'	 and	 'cultural'	 diversity.	 In	 only	 a	 few	 cases,	 in	 fact,	 was	 the	discussion	 triggered	by	 specific	 requests	 for	 recognition	put	 forward	by	minorities.14	 In	 the	
																																								 																				8	In	relation	to	the	construction	of	the	“Negro”	as	a	“thing”	in	modern	Western	humanist	culture,	see	Mbembe	(2018,	p.	140-141).	9	See,	for	instance,	Olivier	Le	Cour	Grandmaison’s	(2010)	essay	about	French	colonial	law	and	the	construction	of	the	category	of		“indigène”.	10	In	relation	to	Italy,	see	for	instance	Giuliani	(2015)	and	Marchetti	(2011).	11	Beginning	from	the	historic	assimilationist	paradigm	in	France.	12	For	an	analysis	of	the	various	European	models,	see	Cerrina	Feroni,	Federico	(2018).	13	Regarding	the	difficulty	in	identifying	in	Europe	a	super-national	strategy	for	the	‘integration’	of	foreigners,	see	Piergigli	(2018,	p.	209-241).	14	For	instance,	in	the	Netherlands	and	the	U.K.,	for	a	certain	period	of	time.	
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majority	 of	 European	 countries,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 'integration'	 of	 foreigners	instead	revolved	around	a	series	of	 conflict	points	artfully	 fueled	by	 the	political	and	media	system,	partly	so	as	to	distract	citizens	from	economic	and	social	problems.	I	am	thinking,	for	example,	 of	 the	 controversy	 over	 veil	 wearing	 in	 France,	 	 a	 debate	 that	 almost	 completely	obscured	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 abandonment	 of	 banlieues	 and	 discrimination	 against	 French	citizens	with	foreign	backgrounds.15	In	2004,	the	law	prohibiting	the	wearing	of	veils	at	school	was	 adopted.16	 In	 2005,	 the	 law	 establishing	 that	 school	 programs	 should	 celebrate	 the	French	colonial	past	took	effect.17	Between	these	two	events	the	“Indigènes	de	la	République”	launched	 their	 appeal,	 with	 young	 people	 from	 the	 suburbs	 speaking	 out	 about	 their	conditions	 of	 inferiority	 within	 French	 society	 and	 calling	 for	 the	 “decolonization	 of	 the	Republic”.18	In	the	2000s,	this	kind	of	controversy	divided	the	country	while	the	suburbs	were	abandoned	 to	 their	 own	 fate,	welfare	 state	 services	were	 cut	 and	 the	 chômage	 system	was	reformed	to	reduce	subsidies.19	Paradoxically,	 therefore,	 the	 demand	 for	 real	 reparations	 for	 the	 damage	 caused	 by	disregard	 for	 non-Western	 cultural	 traditions	was	 relegated	 to	 a	 secondary	 position	 in	 the	European	public	debate	or	even	neglected	altogether.	It	was	this	demand	that	animated	most	of	 the	 communitarian	 (and	 more	 generally	 multiculturalist)	 claims	 being	 made	 in	 North	America.	 (See	Taylor,	 1992)	The	 problem	was	mainly	 formulated	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction:	how	to	maintain	the	hegemony	of	the	dominant	group?	Or,	more	explicitly	in	some	cases,	how	to	'defend'	the	'national	culture'	from	the	'assault'	by	immigrants'	social,	religious	and	cultural	models?	In	Europe,	discussions	about	'integration'	and	related	policies	were	mostly	guided	by	a	 top-down	orientation,	 reflecting	 an	 approach	 that	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 one	that	 had	 inspired	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 multicultural	 paradigm	 in	 countries	 such	 as	Canada.20	This	tendency	gained	ground	during	the	2000s,	reinforced	in	part	by	the	emergence	of	the	terrorist	threat.	In	fact,	in	recent	years	the	focus	has	been	on	the	risk	of	radicalization	among	 foreign-born	 citizens	 and	 young	 people	 in	 particular,	 a	 radicalization	 that	 in	 many	places	is	associated	with	the	'failure'	of	multiculturalism.		
Social	acceleration	and	radicalization		 What	does	“radicalization”	mean?	The	Oxford	dictionaries	(2019)	defines	it	as	“the	action	or	 process	 of	 making	 somebody	 more	 extreme	 or	 radical	 in	 their	 opinions	 on	 political	 or	social	issues”.	Today,	however,	scientific	literature	and	institutional	agencies	use	this	term	to	indicate	a	process	that	begins	with	adopting	such	stances	but	then	leads	to	serious	forms	of	deviance,	 first	and	 foremost	 the	decision	to	enter	 into	 terrorist	groups	and	networks.	Often,	the	term	used	is	“violent	radicalization”.	The	European	Commission	(2008,	p.	5),	for	example,	identifies	this	phenomenon	with	the	adoption	of	opinions,	visions	and	ideas	that	may	lead	to	terrorism.	 The	 reference,	 at	 both	 the	 European	 and	 national	 levels,	 is	 primarily	 to	 Islamic	
																																								 																				15	In	relation	to	the	banlieues	see	for	instance	Fassin	(2011)	and	Bonelli	(2008).	16		Loi	228	of	15	March	2004	about	the	prohibition	to	wear	religious	symbols	in	public	schools.	Regarding	the	affaire	du	voile,	see	for	instance	Pepicelli	(2012).	17	 Loi	 158	 of	 23	 February	 2005,	 of	 which	 Art.	 4	 provided	 for	 school	 programs	 acknowledging	 the	 positive	 role	 of	 French	colonization	(and	successively	abrogated	due	to	the	criticism	it	raised,	especially	in	the	former	colonies).	18	Appel	des	indigènes	de	la	République	(2005).	19	Regarding	the	dismantling	of	the	welfare	state,	see,	for	instance,	Bonelli,	Pelletier	(2010)	and	Supiot	(2015).	20	Jurgen	Habermas	had	already	moved	in	this	direction	in	the	conclusive	part	of	his	essay	dedicated	to	Charles	Taylor’s	critique	of	communitarianism.	See	Habermas,	Taylor	(1996).	
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terrorism.21	 This	 is	 the	 case	 even	 in	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 suffer	 from	 a	 shortage	 of	 radical	right-wing	 or	 left-wing	 groups.22	 There	 have	 been	 multiple	 incidents	 suggesting	 that	radicalization	 is	 a	 complex	 phenomenon	 which	 also	 involves	 citizens	 perceived	 as	autochthonous,	however:	examples	 include	 the	3	February	2018	attack	 in	Macerata,	 Italy	 in	which	a	neo-fascist	militant	opened	fire	on	several	immigrants,	but	also	more	serious	cases	in	Europe	 such	 as	 the	 	 2011	 massacres	 committed	 by	 an	 extreme	 right-wing	 sympathizer	 in	Norway	that	killed	70	people.	Even	as	I	write,	the	media	are	reporting	on	the	police	seizure	of	an	arsenal	in	Turin	owned	by	an	Italian	right-wing	extremist	group	whose	members	fought	in	Ukraine,	with	contents	including	an	air-to-air	missile.	(La	Repubblica,	2019a)23	Radicalization	can	also	refer	to	typically	local	phenomena	such	as	the	socialization	of	young	people	into	the	mafia	subculture.24	If	attention	to	Islamic	terrorism	is	justified	by	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	recent	terrorist	attacks	in	Europe	were	committed	by	people	who	claimed	to	act	in	the	name	of	 a	 fundamentalist	 interpretation	 of	 Islam	 and	 often	 identified	 themselves	 with	 the	 ISIS	project,25	a	more	complex	approach	to	the	theme	of	radicalization,	in	particular	that	of	young	people,	 may	 help	 to	 identify	 some	 social	 and	 educational	 strategies	 for	 preventing	 it	 in	different	contexts.26	In	 a	 recent	 essay	 titled	 La	 trappola	 dell’identità	 culturale:	 dal	 multiculturalismo	 alla	
radicalizzazione,	 Emilio	 Santoro	 (2018,	 p.	 87-115)	 critiques	 social	 integration	 policies	 that	focus	 on	 a	 concept	 of	 culture	 as	 clearly	 identifiable	 and	 substantially	 static,	 a	 concept	vigorously	refuted	by	contemporary	anthropology.	The	author	takes	 issue	 in	particular	with	Charles	Taylor	who,	as	is	well	known,	defended	the	Canadian	multicultural	model	by	raising	the	 issue	 of	 acknowledging	 collective	 cultural	 rights	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 survival	 of	minority	cultures.	(See	Taylor,	1992)	According	to	Santoro,	by	basing	the	solution	to	problems	of	coexistence	on	a	conception	of	cultures	as	the	wellsprings	of	the	ultimate	goals	and	values	to	which	individuals	conform,	there	is	a	tendency	to	nourish	opposing	ideologies	and	thereby	exacerbate	conflicts.	Based	on	the	studies	of	ethnometodologists	(Garfinkel,	1967),	he	argues	that	individual	actions	are	not	determined	by	values,	but	rather	depend	on	the	cognitive	skills	of	 individuals.	 Culture	 can	 therefore	 be	 reconceptualized	 as	 a	 set	 of	 cognitive	 resources,	 a	"toolbox"	that	helps	social	actors	to	identify	their	own	strategies	of	action.	Today's	 societies	 require	 rapid	 adaptation	 not	 only	 and,	 perhaps,	 not	 so	much	 because	they	 encompass	 people	 of	 different	 origins,	 but	 also	 and	 above	 all	 because	 technological	evolution	and	information	bombardment	require	the	continuous	updating	of	individual	skills,	
																																								 																				21	 This	 definition	 is	 included	 in	 a	 2005	 Communication	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 regarding	 	 “Terrorist	 Recruitment:	addressing	the	factors	contributing	to	violent	radicalisation”.	22	 See	 the	 analysis	 carried	 out	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Youth	 Empowerment	 and	 Innovation	 Project	 funded	 by	 the	 European	 Union	(Gavravrielides,	2018).	23	In	relation	to	the	danger	of	radical	right-wing	terrorism	in	the	United	States	and	Western	Europe,	see	Institute	for	Economics	and	Peace	(2018,	p.	47).	24	Regarding	this	issue,	see	Rando,	Giovetti	(2018,	p.	53-57).	25	See	Institute	for	Economics	and	Peace	(2018,	p.	46).	26	 This	 is	 the	 direction	 that	 the	 already	 cited	 Youth	 Empowerment	 and	 Innovation	 Project	 funded	 by	 the	 European	 Union	identifies.	 The	 Report	 of	 the	 European	 Commission's	 Expert	 Group	 on	 Violent	 Radicalization	 underlines	 that	 the	 trajectories	leading	to	getting	involved	in	different	forms	of	terrorism	have	common	elements	and	recommends	both	specifically	studying	the	dynamics	relative	to	the	different	terrorist	groups,	and	analysing	the	common	structural	features:	“radicalisation	leading	to	acts	of	 terrorism	 is	 context-specific.	Past	 and	present	waves	of	 violent	 radicalisation	which	 lead	 to	 terrorism	among	mainly	young	people	share	certain	structural	features.	Firstly,	radicalisation	thrives	in	an	enabling	environment	that	is	characterized	by	a	more	widely	shared	sense	of	 injustice,	exclusion	and	humiliation	(real	or	perceived)	among	the	constituencies	the	terrorists	claim	to	represent.	 Secondly,	 radicalisation	 always	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 that	 enabling	 social	 environment	 and	 individual	trajectories	towards	greater	militancy.	Thirdly,	terrorist	violence	(and	in	particular	suicide	bombing)	stands	only	at	the	far	end	of	a	wide	repertoire	of	possible	 radical	expressions	and	only	a	 small	number	of	 radicals	become	 terrorist	extremists”	 (European	Commission	Expert	Group	on	Violent	Radicalisation,	2008,	p.	17-18).	Diverse	counter-terrorism	strategies	are	outlined	also	in	the	above	cited	Institute	for	Economics	and	Peace	(2018,	p.	64-78).	
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a	constant	cognitive	effort.	As	Hartmut	Rosa	has	made	clear,	we	live	under	the	yoke	of	social	acceleration	and	this	climate	has	taken	on	a	totalitarian	character,	swallowing	up	the	logics	of	recognition	and	communication	typical	of	early	modernity.	In	a	world	in	which	the	past	‘goes	by	faster	and	faster’	while	the	future	is	no	longer	conceived	in	terms	of	progress,	experiences	and	 expectations	 prove	 less	 and	 less	 reliable.	 While	 modernity	 signaled	 the	 shift	 from	 an	inter-generational	to	a	generational	pace	of	social	change,	our	historical	moment	seems	to	be	characterized	by	 intra-generational	 social	 changes.	 (Rosa,	 2013,	 in	particular	 ch.	 1)	Locking	oneself	up	in	a	‘culture’	conceptualized	as	clearly	identifiable	and	fixed	may	thus	represent	a	defensive	reaction	(See	Rosa,	2013,	in	particular	ch.	2)	in	that	it	gives	the	illusion	of	'stopping	time'.	 This	 illusion	 allows	 us	 to	 regard	 ourselves	 as	 sheltered	 from	 the	 principle	 of	competition	underlying	social	acceleration	and	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	believe	we	might	'finally'	obtain	a	stable	form	of	recognition.	It	 is	 not	 only	 those	 who	 identify	 with	 minority	 communities	 who	 feel	 the	 need	 for	ideological	and	often	radical	oppositional	deceleration	(See	Rosa,	2013,	ch.	3);	this	same	need	is	experienced	by	those	who	consider	themselves	part	of	the	majority	–	in	numerical	terms	–	and	yet	do	not	belong	to	that	elite	that	enjoys	the	benefits	of	globalization	or,	if	they	are	part	of	 it,	 fear	 they	 might	 lose	 their	 social	 position.	 Whether	 pursuing	 a	 simplified	 version	 of	multiculturalism	or	seeking	to	assimilate	foreigners	into	a	presumed	'national	culture',	when	public	 policies	 contribute	 to	 the	 “ideologization”	 of	 “cultures”	 (Santoro,	 2018,	 p.	 107)	 they	actually	 strengthen	 this	 process,	 generating	 a	 two-fold	 radicalization:	 both	 minorities	 and	members	of	the	majority.	As	Marco	Revelli	(2019,	p.	IX,	English	translation	mine)	has	written,	these	forms	of	identity	closure	do	indeed	exist	in	the	contemporary	world	and	they	form:		 the	 raw	 material	 of	 which	 every	 nationalism	 is	 made,	 every	 ethnocentric	conception	seeking	to	oppose	the	tough	matter	of	the	body	to	the	dissipating	fury	of	an	accelerated	temporality,	the	physiological	irreducibility	of	the	blood	to	the	abstract	undifferentiation	of	flows,	the	static	slowness	of	tradition	to	the	dizzying	 speed	 of	 bits.	 And	 from	 the	 qualifying	 specification	 of	 "us"	(constituted	at	the	level	of	community	through	opposition	to	some	"others")	to	the	 depersonalizing	 generic	 character	 of	 "all"	 (dissolved	 in	 the	 anonymous	seriality	of	atomized	individuals).		The	 “identity	 trap”	 thus	 refers	 to	both	 simplified	 versions	of	multiculturalism	and	even	interculturalism27	and	to	new	nationalisms.	I	believe	it	can	be	argued	that	the	“identity	trap”	and	the	risk	of	radicalization	are	not	necessarily	found	in	all	forms	of	multiculturalism.	Rather	frequently,	 however,	 multiculturalism	 has	 also	 been	 conceived	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 stem	 the	radicalization	 of	 minorities	 while	 preserving	 the	 liberal	 model.28	 Moreover,	 it	 was	 not	considered	an	alternative	 to	 the	political	models	supporting	neoliberal	globalization.	On	 the	contrary,	in	many	cases	it	has	helped	to	convey	the	idea	that	globalization	is	a	plural	process	in	which	everyone	can	participate.	It	is	precisely	this	image	that	a	Justin	Trudeau-led	Canada	projects	into	the	world,	that	is,	the	image	of	a	country	in	which	multiculturalism	has	taken	on	a	“holistic”	character29	as	it	became	more	and	more	open	to	embracing	the	claims	of	different	social	groups	(from	linguistic	minorities	to	sexual	minorities)	and	to	a	conception	of	personal	'identities'	as	intersectional	constructs.30	Along	the	same	lines,	another	example	I	could	cite	in	
																																								 																				27	 For	 a	 radical	 and	 yet	 very	 keen	 critique	 of	 “intercultural”	 practices	 and	 pedagogy	 specifically	 referencing	 Italy,	 see	 Baroni	(2013).	28	Will	Kymlicka’s	(1995)	theory	of	multiculturalism	unfolds	in	the	same	direction.	29	Regarding	this	point	see	Ceccherini	(2018,	p.	345-383).	30	Regarding	the	notion	of	intersectionality,	see	the	by-now	classic	Crenshaw	(1991,	p.	1241-1299).	
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the	 European	 area	 is	 the	 “London	 is	 open!”31	 campaign	 that	 London’s	Muslim	mayor	 Sadiq	Khan,	of	Pakistani	origins,	created	to	oppose	terrorism	but	also	Brexit;	this	campaign	assumes	linguistic,	cultural	and	even	 'ethnic'	 'diversity'	as	the	hallmark	of	 the	city,	casting	London	as	global	 and	open	 to	 the	world	 in	 contrast	 to	both	 the	 reactionary	 radicalization	of	 terrorists	and	the	nationalistic	retreat	of	the	English	countryside.	It	 can	 therefore	 be	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 no	 direct	 link	 between	 multiculturalism	 and	radicalization.	Moreover,	radicalization	processes,	 for	example	 involving	young	Muslims,	are	occurring	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Netherlands	 but	 also	 in	 France,	 where	 the	 state	 has	always	 opposed	 multiculturalism.	 Instead,	 there	 is	 a	 link	 between	 radicalization	 and	 the	dynamics	 of	 social	 exclusion32	 exacerbated	 by	 neoliberal	 policies	 that	 erode	 welfare	 and	promote	 inequality	 (see	 Oxfam,	 2018;	 Id.,	 2019),	 both	 in	 countries	 that	 have	 chosen	 a	multicultural	approach	and	in	those	that	have	rejected	it.	As	mentioned	above,	these	dynamics	also	involve	both	subjects	who	perceive	themselves	as	belonging	to	minorities	and	those	who	identify	as	an	‘autochthonous	majority	group’.	Making	this	claim	is	not	tantamount	to	arguing	that	 radicalization	 is	 caused	 by	 social	 marginality	 or	 poverty,33	 but	 it	 does	 mean	 that	 the	frustration	 produced	 by	 some	 dynamics	 of	 exclusion	 or	 inferiorization,	 especially	 if	experienced	by	people	suffering	from	real	psychic	pathologies,34	may	find	an	outlet	in	political	radicalization	 and	 in	 the	 choice	 to	 carry	out	 terrorist	 acts.	A	more	 attentive	 reading	 shows,	moreover,	 that	 such	 individual	 pathologies	 are	 part	 of	 a	 more	 general	 social	 pathology	associated	with	the	problems	of	integrating	individuals	into	contemporary	societies.35	Indeed,	fanatical	 followers	of	global	 Islam	and	ISIS,	 just	 like	extremists	promoting	new	nationalisms	and	supporters	of	racist	theories,	find	meaning	in	‘faith’	or	in	the	‘ideal’,	a	kind	of	meaning	that	seems	to	be	 lacking	 from	their	 lives.	 	Radicalization	 is	 the	means	 to	a	 life	 (and	sometimes	a	death)	as	protagonists,	as	heroes.	They	 look	to	this	“narrative	of	eternity”	(Snyder,	2018)	to	protect	 them	 from	 the	 rapid	 passage	 of	 time	 characterizing	 global	 societies	 and	 to	 shelter	them	from	fierce	competition,	erasing	the	abyss	of	social	failure	that	constantly	yawns	before	them36	in	today’s	“performance	society”.	(Chicchi,	Simone,	2017)	Those	 who	 radicalize	 on	 each	 of	 the	 two	 fronts	 often	 feel	 betrayed	 by	 neoliberal	globalization37	 and	 are	 driven	 by	 the	 desire	 for	 revenge.	 The	 chance	 to	 build	 an	 enemy	 on	which	 to	 pour	 out	 their	 anger	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 people’s	 embracing	 fundamentalist	beliefs.	 It	 is	 often	 individuals	 who	 have	 no	 ties	 to	 a	 specific	 community	 who	 approach	recruiters,	either	 in	person	or	on	 the	web.	Examining	recent	essays	by	Renzo	Guolo	(2018),	
																																								 																				31	See,	for	instance,	the	video	circulated	on	Facebook	:	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2204693939746176	(last	accessed	July	5th		2019).	32	See,	for	instance,	Institute	for	Economics	and	Peace	(2018).	33	A	number	of	authors	who	have	studied	 the	radicalization	of	young	Muslims	 in	Europe	have	also	rejected	 this	 thesis,	 see	 for	example	Guolo	(2018)	and	Roy	(2016).	34	See	the	analysis	of	 the	profile	of	 the	perpetrators	responsible	 for	the	recent	attacks	 in	Europe	as	outlined	 in	Olivia,	Gabrieli,	Gabrieli	(2018,	p.	27-45).	Beyond	the	report’s	lexicon	and	criminological	approach,	it	is	useful	for	pointing	out	the	features	some	attackers	share.	35	The	same	 interpretation	 is	accepted	 in	 the	above-mentioned	Report	of	 the	European	Commission's	Expert	Group	on	Violent	Radicalisation	(European	Commission	Expert	Group	on	Violent	Radicalisation,	2008,	p.	17-18).	36	 This	 dynamic	 is	 very	 effectively	 described	 in	 Mohsin	 Hamid’s	 The	 Reluctant	 Fundamentalist	 (2007),	 a	 novel	 in	 which	 the	protagonist,	 looking	 back,	 tells	 us	 the	 story	 of	 his	 transformation	 from	 a	 young	Pakistani	 admitted	 to	 Princeton	 to	 a	 'wolf'	 of	global	 finance,	 ready	 to	 apply	 its	 cruel	 logic	 in	 'developing'	 countries,	 to	 a	 teacher	who	 has	 returned	 home	 and	 is	 accused	 of	fomenting	anti-American	 terrorism.	 In	 fact,	 after	9/11	 the	 sense	of	 rejection	of	 the	 competition	and	 cynicism	 typical	of	 global	finance	makes	its	way	into	the	soul	of	the	protagonist.	Heeding	the	call	of	his	own	roots	and	the	need	to	be	in	solidarity	with	the	Muslims	persecuted	by	 the	policies	of	 the	new	War	on	Terror,	 he	 abandons	 the	 typical	American	yuppie	 style	 to	 grow	a	 long	beard.	His	origin	 is	 thus	perceived	as	dangerous	and	he	realizes	that	he	will	never	feel	definitively	 'included',	discovering	both	that	his	identity	as	a	successful	young	man	is	unstable	and	that	American	imperialism	has	traumatized	him	and	his	people.	37In	many	cases,	as	Marco	Revelli	(2019,	specifically	part	3)	has	pointed	out,	they	feel	betrayed	as	a	result	of	real	impoverishment.	
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Olivier	Roy	(2016),	Vidino,	Marone	and	Entenmann	(2017)	and	research	published	by	Milan-based	ISPI	on	jihadism	in	the	West,	Tommaso	Sarti	(2018,	p.	69-78)	points	out	that:		 The	 protagonists	 of	 the	 new	 global	 jihad	 are	 young	 or	 very	 young,	 mainly	belong	 to	 the	 second	 generation	 (often	 re-converted)	 or	 are	 autochthonous	converts	to	Sunni	Islam;	they	speak	English,	French,	Italian,	dress	in	a	Western	style	 and	 follow	 haram	 lifestyles	 (that	 is,	 transgressing	 a	 series	 of	prohibitions),	while	 they	 do	 not	 speak	 Arabic,	 they	 have	 little	 knowledge	 of	Islam	 (...)	 and	 surf	 the	 Internet	 where	 even	 subjects	 who	 live	 in	 contexts	characterized	 by	 weak	 social	 ties	 can	 feel	 part	 of	 a	 community	 offering	 a	strong	sense	of	belonging	(Sarti,	2018,	p.	73,	English	translation	mine).		Such	recruits	are	 thus	usually	 individuals	who	did	not	grow	up	adhering	 to	a	particular	Islamic	tradition	but	approached	the	uprooted,	simplified	and,	in	fact,	fundamentalist	version	of	 “global	 Islam”	directly	as	young	adults.	 (See	Roy,	2002)	As	 they	 ignore	 the	 complexity	of	religious	belief	and	the	plurality	of	its	interpretations,	they	embrace	a	dogmatic	vision	which	they	assume	to	be	the	authentic	and	indisputable	‘truth’.	Similarly,	 young	 Europeans	 who	 rediscover	 nationalist	 ideologies,	 becoming	 involved	with	extreme	right-wing	groups,	cultivate	a	myth	of	the	nation	that	is	quite	distinct	from	their	perspective	 on	 life.	 They	 lack	 any	 experience	 in	 the	 military	 ethics	 based	 on	 love	 of	 the	homeland	that	they	claim	to	want	to	take	as	a	guide	for	their	action.	Christian	Raimo's	recent	investigation	 into	Roman	adolescents	who	belong	 to	neo-fascist	 groups	 shows,	 for	example,	that	 they	 mostly	 think	 of	 Fascism	 as	 a	 “fashion”,	 especially	 appreciating	 its	 rejection	 of	immigration,	and	believe	that	the	“sense	of	sacrifice”	–	a	stance	that	supposedly	characterizes	their	militancy	–	is	forged	by	handing	out	“leaflets	at	seven	in	the	morning”	(Raimo,	2018).38	Even	 the	 indoctrination	 they	 undergo	 and	 the	 cultural	 references	 they	 adopt	 are	 rather	simplified.39	They	often	have	very	little	knowledge	of	history	and,	when	they	invoke	their	own	Christian	 roots,	 they	usually	do	 so	without	 actually	 complying	with	 the	dictates	of	 religious	doctrine.	 This	 is	 the	 case,	 in	 fact,	 not	 only	 of	 people	 embracing	 the	 extremism	 of	 radical	groups,	but	also	of	the	many	who	join	right-wing	parties	that	call	for	“sovereignism”,	present	themselves	as	 the	defenders	of	Christian	values,40	and	base	their	political	action	on	hostility	towards	immigrants.41	Their	involvement	is	often	based	on	explicit	social	envy,	an	ambivalent	feeling	 that	 favors	 their	 transition	 “almost	 seamlessly	 from	 competitive	 emulation	 to	destructive	hostility”	(Revelli,	2019,	p.	214,	English	translation	mine),42	a	widespread	feeling	
																																								 																				38	 The	 expression	 in	 brackets	 were	 used	 by	 young	 neo-fascist	 militants	 or	 group	 leaders	 the	 author	 interviewed	 (English	translation	mine).	39	In	addition	to	Raimo,	see	for	instance	Cammelli	(2015).	40	 Although	 the	 Catholic	 pontiff	 himself	 contradicted	 them.	 See	 for	 example	 Pope	 Francis'	 message	 in	 the	 hearing	 with	 the	participants	to	the	Plenary	Assembly	of	the	Pontifical	Academy	of	Social	Sciences	of	May	2nd		2019	in	which	he	recalled	that:	"the	Church	has	always	exhorted	the	love	of	one's	own	people,	homeland,	to	respect	the	treasure	of	the	various	cultural	expressions",	and	yet	has	always	"warned	people	and	governments	about	the	deviations	of	this	attachment"	when	it	turns	into	exclusion	and	hatred,	when	"it	becomes	conflictual	nationalism	that	raises	walls,	or	even	racism	or	anti-Semitism"	(English	translation	mine).	(La	Repubblica,	2019b).	Protestant	religious	authorities	took	on	similar	positions.	See,	for	example,	on	this	subject,	the	episode	of	the	TV	programme	on	Protestant	culture	and	faith	in	Italy	and	throughout	the	world,	by	the	Federation	of	Evangelical	Churches	in	Italy	 in	 partnership	with	 RAI	 (2019),	 “Protestantesimo”,	 broadcasted	 on	 RAI	 2	 on	 July	 14th	 2019,	 entitled	 “Sovereignism	 and	Christianity”.	41	Regarding	the	relationships	between	fascists	and	sovereignists	in	Italy,	see	Berizzi	(2018).	42	Obviously,	 I	do	not	wish	 to	argue	 that	citizens	who	 identify	with	sovereigntist	parties	are	radicalized	 to	 the	same	degree	as	those	supporting	terrorist	groups	or	extreme	right-wing	groups.	Nor	do	I	believe	that	adhering	to	terrorism	can	be	considered	equivalent	 to	 certain	 young	 people	 becoming	 involved	 in	 extreme	 right-wing	 political	 groups	which	 are	 considered	 legal.	My	analysis	 does,	 however,	 aim	 to	 highlight	 some	 significant	 elements	 of	 continuity	 in	 the	 psychological	 and	 social	 resources	 of	mobilization	and	radicalization.	
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in	the	“society	of	enmity”	(Mbembe,	2018,	ch.	2)	in	which	the	social	bond	is	reconstructed	as	a	hostility	 bond.	 (Mbembe,	 2018,	 ch.	 2)	 For	 this	 reason,	 scholarly	 analyses	 contesting	 the	indiscriminate	 use	 of	 the	 "populism"	 label	 for	 radical	 European	 right-wing	 formations,	including	 the	 Italian	 ones,	 are	 convincing	 in	 their	 argument	 that	 these	 new	 nationalisms	would	 be	 more	 effectively	 framed	 as	 “functional	 substitutes	 for	 fascism”.	 	 Such	 a	 labeling	change	 captures	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 atomistic	 and	 almost	 nihilistic	 drive,	 mainly	 aimed	 at	constructing	the	enemy	as	the	‘ethnically	different’	 ‘other’	who	is	defended	by	the	privileged	‘caste’,	 actually	 prevails	 over	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 common	 belonging	 to	 the	 ‘people’.43	 For	 these	citizens,	 as	 for	 fundamentalists	 who	 embrace	 radical	 Islam,	 the	 main	 function	 of	 the	community	 is	 to	 provide	 immunization	 (See	 Pulcini,	 2013),	 that	 is,	 it	 must	 prevent	 the	possibility	of	being	infected	by	‘others’,	of	having	one's	own	life	perspective	questioned.	It	 is	above	 all	 a	 virtual	 community,	 the	 simulacrum	 of	 a	 form	 of	 belonging	 that	 people	 are	 no	longer	able	to	experience	in	the	substance	of	social	relations.		
The	new,	unstable	“us”		 In	the	essay	cited	above,	Santoro	(2008)	echoes	the	argument	in	Diritto,	diritti.	Lo	Stato	di	
diritto	nell’era	della	globalizzazione	 to	suggest	 that,	 in	order	 to	overcome	our	contemporary	impasse,	it	is	necessary	to	abandon	the	ambition	of	building	collective	political	subjectivities	based	on	the	identification	of	an	‘us’.	In	his	opinion,	we	must	instead	defend	and	consolidate	the	 liberal	 model	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 –	 with	 its	 individualistic	 background	 –	 founded	 on	pluralism,44	mainly	 understood	 as	 a	 cognitive	 resource	 that	 helps	 individuals	 lead	 a	 “stable	life”	in	a	society	that	is	necessarily	“unstable”.	The	first	step	in	this	direction	would	be	to	make	conflicts	 local,	 seeking	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 that	 individuals	 face	 while	 abandoning	 any	thinking	 focused	 on	 protecting	 “cultures”	 but	 also	 the	 idea	 of	 promoting	 dialogue	 between	“cultures”.	The	more	productive	perspective	to	adopt,	he	suggests,	is	one	in	which	dialogue	is	always	conceived	as	a	practice	enacted	by	people.	The	author	therefore	takes	a	stand	against	a	“politics	of	identities”	(See	Young,	1990)	that	exacerbates	social	division.	While	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 fair	 to	 hold	 multiculturalism	 as	 a	 legal	 and	 political	 model	responsible	 for	 promoting	 radicalization,	 it	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that,	 today,	 the	 move	 to	recognize	 minority	 rights	 is	 increasingly	 perceived	 as	 an	 erosion	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	majorities	 defining	 themselves	 as	 autochthonous	 and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 sexual	 minorities,	 as	granting	forms	of	freedom	that	are	destabilizing	for	the	heteronormative	system.	Thinking	of	these	 claims	 as	 demands	 for	 recognizing	 and	 protecting	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 which	individuals	 are	 entitled	 rather	 than	 as	 collective	 claims	 raised	 by	 specifically	 defined	communities	may	thus	be	an	effective	strategy	in	that	it	frames	political	conflict	in	legal	terms,	thereby	mitigating	the	clash.	At	the	same	time,	consolidating	people's	cognitive	resources	and	focusing	 on	 the	 dissemination	 of	 knowledge	 in	 an	 era	 of	 widespread	 functional	 illiteracy	might	 help	 them	 resist	 the	 aesthetic	 turn	 (Rosa,	 2013)	 in	 politics,	 in	 which	 emotions	 and	images	prevail	over	reasoning	(and	programs),	and	make	it	possible	to	relaunch	the	idea	that	the	topics	in	public	debate	must	be	thoroughly	pondered.	The	possibility	of	comparing	different	positions	within	a	communicative	horizon	that	is	as	free	 as	 possible	 from	 distorting	 power	 relations	 is	 a	 fundamental	 element	 of	 many	 liberal	
																																								 																				43	See	Germani	(1978).	For	an	interpretation	of	Italian	right-wing	parties	informed	by	Germani’s	 lesson	see	Serra	(2019,	p.	55-66).	44	This	thesis	thus	appears	similar	to	Habermas’	position.	
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theories	 of	 democracy.45	As	 scholars	 have	 repeatedly	 argued,	 democracy	has	 never	 actually	been	a	realm	of	reason	in	which,	as	the	philosophical	ideal	would	have	it,	more	weight	is	given	to	“the	view	that	gets	all	the	details	worked	out	coherently	and	clearly,	rather	than	the	view	whose	 proponents	 shout	 the	 loudest”.	 (Nussbaum,	 2000,	 p.	 300)	 In	 democracy,	 certain	dominant	 groups	 have	 always	 prevailed.	 The	 self-government	 of	 citizens	 based	 on	 the	possibility	of	across-the-board	participation	in	political	life	thanks	in	part	to	the	construction	of	a	public	space	that	protects	people's	right	to	free	expression	and	access	to	information	has	always	been	an	 ideal.	As	Wendy	Brown	has	pointed	out,	 this	 ideal,	 along	with	 the	values	of	political	 equality	 and	 freedom,	 are	 nevertheless	 indispensable	 aspirations.	 The	 language	 of	democracy	 provides	 tools	 that	 have	 so	 far	 proved	 irreplaceable	 in	 the	 fight	 against	heterodetermination.	 While	 we	 can	 certainly	 consider	 the	 disconnection	 between	 formally	proclaimed	principles	and	actual	political,	social	and	juridical	conditions	to	be	a	fundamental	vice	of	liberal	democracies,	it	is	nonetheless	the	liberal-democratic	lexicon	that	has	provided	so	many	 women	 and	men	with	 the	 words	 to	 denounce	 this	 disconnection	 and	 expand	 the	“sacred	space”	of	citizenship:		 Women,	 racial	 and	 religious	minorities,	 slave	 descendants,	 new	 immigrants,	queers,	 not	 to	 mention	 the	 poor	 and	 working	 classes,	 have	 seized	 on	 the	universalism	 and	 abstraction	 of	 liberal	 democratic	 personhood	 to	 insist	 on	belonging	 to	 the	 category	 of	 “man”	 (when	 they	 did	 not),	 to	 stretch	 liberal	meanings	of	equality	(to	make	them	substantive,	not	only	formal),	and	to	press	outward	 on	 freedom	 as	 well	 (to	 make	 it	 bear	 on	 controlling	 conditions	 of	existence,	 not	 mere	 choice	 within	 existing	 conditions).	 (Brown,	 2015,	 pos.	3052-3056)	
	Constitutional	states	then	explicitly	rejected	the	project	of	a	purely	formal	democracy	by	linking	the	effectiveness	of	rights	to	the	substantial	nature	of	democracy.	(Ferrajoli,	2016)	Pluralism	and	fear	of	social	disintegration	have	always	coexisted	in	a	state	of	tension;	so	far,	 the	 relative	 stability	 of	 institutions	 has	 resolved	 this	 tension	 in	 Western	 democracies.	Beginning	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	it	was	precisely	the	constitutional	state	that	 curbed	 this	 tension.	And	yet,	 the	 contemporary	dynamics	 surrounding	 the	evolution	of	turbo-capitalism	 as	 well	 as	 its	 associated	 hyper-acceleration	 and,	 more	 generally,	 the	consolidation	and	spread	of	neoliberal	rationality	have	profoundly	shaken	the	foundations	of	this	juridical,	political	and	cultural	construction.	The	social	and	political	crisis	is	linked	to	an	‘anthropological	crisis’	and	leads	to	a	“undoing	of	democracy”	(Brown,	2015)	by	promoting	a	“deconstituent	process.”	(Ferrajoli,	2016,	p.	76,	English	translation	mine)	It	therefore	becomes	much	more	difficult	 to	 localize	and	proceduralize	conflicts	 if	 the	 ‘material	 foundation’	of	 the	constitutional	 state	 is	 undermined	 (See	 Preterossi,	 2015,	 ch.	 2)	 and	 “neoliberal	 rationality”	transforms	 “the	 character,	 the	 meaning	 and	 the	 operation	 of	 democracy’s	 constituent	elements”,	 converting	 them	 from	 “distinctly	 political”	 into	 “economic”.	 (Brown,	 2015,	 pos.	122)	Conflicts	 can	be	proceduralized	 through	 the	 constant	work	 carried	out	by	 certain	 state,	supranational	 and	 international	 institutions,	 beginning	 with	 jurisdictional	 courts	 (Santoro,	2008)	 and	 the	 people	 and	 groups	 which	 enact	 a	 claiming	 process46	 to	 present	 these	
																																								 																				45	See	in	particular,	Habermas	(1981,	vol.	1	and	2).	However,	Santoro	does	not	identify	with	this	position;	he	simply	points	out	that	 the	 channels	 of	 democratic	 political	 conflict	 are	 not	 suitable	 for	 dealing	 with	 "identity-based	 differences"	 and	 therefore	argues	that	this	type	of	conflict	can	best	be	dealt	with	through	the	channels	of	legal	conflict.	46	Regarding	the	importance	of	claiming,	beginning	from	Feinberg’s	perspective	(1970),	see	also	Baccelli	(2009).	
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institutions	 with	 requests	 for	 “justice”,	 thereby	 activating	 the	 protection	 of	 fundamental	rights.	This	work	often	takes	place	ex	post,	however;	it	remains	limited	to	certain	areas	and	is	constantly	at	risk.	Moreover,	while	judges	often	take	a	stand	as	the	defenders	of	fundamental	rights,	 it	 cannot	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 attitude	 is	 adopted	 everywhere47	 or	 definitively.	 In	analyzing	some	important	US	rulings	and	the	Supreme	Court's	ruling	in	the	Citizens	United	v.	
Federal	Election	Commission	case	in	particular,	Wendy	Brown	(2015,	ch.	5)	clearly	shows	that	jurisprudence	may	also	participate	in	the	“undoing	of	democracy”	and	the	disintegration	of	its	political,	legal	and	social	fabric	by	adopting	a	neoliberal	rationality.	Changes	occurring	at	the	social,	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 political	 levels	 affect	 the	 “legal	 consciousness”	 (Ross,	 1958);	indeed,	this	consciousness	is	forged	within	ongoing	conflicts.	(Inter)national	 constitutionalism48	 is	 rooted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 values	 which,	 although	reinterpreted	from	time	to	time,	are	the	fruit	of	a	political-constitutional	design.	They	impose	a	programmatic	vision	that	is	increasingly	difficult	to	implement	in	an	atomized	society	and	in	the	 absence	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 political	 mediation	 previously	 provided	 by	 great	 mass	 parties,	parties	in	which	the	citizens	identified	in	the	service	of	an	ideology.49	More	and	more	people,	even	 in	 Western	 democracies,	 feel	 the	 need	 to	 pass	 on	 to	 others	 the	 hyper-responsibility	instilled	 by	 the	 neoliberal	 anthropological	 model	 and	 to	 find	 more	 stable	 bases	 of	identification.	 In	some	cases,	as	mentioned	above,	 they	seek	a	 form	of	recognition	for	which	they	are	even	willing	to	abandon	claims	of	social	justice	that	seem	more	difficult	to	achieve.	In	other	cases,	however,	 the	construction	of	a	collective	political	subjectivity	serves	 to	activate	mobilization,	so	as	to	act	out	the	conflict.	In	 this	 context,	 the	suggestion	of	abandoning	any	reference	 to	 “cultures”,	understood	 in	essentialist	 terms,	 appears	 very	 useful	 for	 guiding	 public	 policy.	 Policy	 makers	 looking	 to	make	 administrative	 choices	 that	 are	 mindful	 of	 social	 complexity	 (e.g.	 in	 the	 fields	 of	education,	health,	 labor	policies,	etc.)	 in	particular	would	be	advised	to	adopt	this	approach.	This	 shift	 is	 also	 highly	 important	 for	 academic	 discussion	 and	 efforts	 to	 more	 generally	channel	 public	 decision-making	 processes,50	 jurisprudential	 interpretation	 and	 the	formulation	of	political	objectives	on	the	part	of	civil	society	movements.	Such	work	has	the	potential	 to	 generate	 valuable	 effects	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 although	 it	 must	 be	 admitted	 that	 it	requires	 the	 involvement	 of	 ‘enlightened’	 and	 motivated	 élites	 and	 social	 groups.	 These	groups	 are	 not	 created	a	 priori;	 rather	 they	 are	 formed	 in	 part	 through	 political	 and	 social	activism	and	consolidated	through	(often	temporary	and	unstable)	alliances	which	enable	the	forging	of	collective	actions	and	allow	their	voices	 to	be	heard	on	 the	political	and	mediatic	scene.	I	am	thinking,	for	example,	of	the	transnational	feminist	movement	Ni	Una	Menos	or	of	the	environmental	movements	that	have	surfaced	once	again	in	the	face	of	the	climate	change	emergency.51	 In	 particular,	 from	 a	 contemporary	 perspective	 the	 work	 of	 preserving	 the	founding	values	of	the	constitutional	state	does	not	seem	so	distinct	from	the	fight	against	the	degeneration	 of	 financial	 capitalism	 that	 threatens	 not	 only	 democracy	 and	 fundamental	rights,52	 but	 also	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 the	 human	 species	 on	 Earth.	 (See	 Klein,	 2014)	 This	
																																								 																				47	Think,	for	example,	of	the	different	fate	of	asylum	seekers	in	the	United	States	depending	on	the	state	in	which	they	apply.	See	Lanard	(2019).	48	Borrowing	here	Tecla	Mazzarese’s	expression	(2018,	p.	63-85).	49	See	the	interesting	analysis	on	the	relationship	between	populism	and	law	developed	in	the	monographic	issue	no.1,	2019	of	the	journal	“Questione	Giustizia.	Trimestrale	promosso	da	Magistratura	Democratica”.	50	Regarding	the	importance	of	philosophy	for	public	decision-making	see	Nussbaum	(2000).	51	 See,	 for	 instance,	 the	monographic	 issue	 of	 the	 journal	 “Jura	 gentium”	 focusing	 on	La	 crisi	 dei	 paradigmi	 e	 il	 cambiamento	
climatico,	vol.	16,	no.	1,	2019.	52Here	 it	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 the	 battle	 Luigi	 Ferrajoli	 has	 been	 carrying	 out	 for	 years	with	 extraordinary	 lucidity	 and	tenacity,	defending	social	rights	as	the	basis	of	democracy	and	equality	as	the	cardinal	principle	of	the	constitutional	state.		
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work	 cannot	 avoid	 engaging	 in	 confrontation	 with	 the	 existing	 political,	 social,	 economic,	environmental	 and	gender	 conflicts	 and	with	 the	awareness	 that	 the	value	of	pluralism	can	only	 be	 affirmed	 by	 mediating	 and	 ‘taking	 seriously’	 the	 demands	 of	 social	 actors.	 To	articulate	 such	 claims	 in	 terms	 of	 “politics	 of	 difference”	 is,	 as	 Santoro	 has	 argued,	 a	 losing	move.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 approach	 has	 succeeded	 in	 revealing	 the	 limits	 of	 modern	universalism.	 On	 the	 theoretical	 level,	 our	 efforts	 should	 build	 on	 the	 longstanding	 work	carried	out	by	critical	theories	in	general	and	feminist	theory	in	particular	to	seek	to	render	universalism	more	 inclusive,	 that	 is,	 to	 redefine	 it	 from	the	bottom	up	as	a	 “universalism	of	multiplicities”.	(Pitch,	2004,	p.	114,	English	translation	mine)	This	theoretical	work	does	have	a	political	 impact,	 however.53	 Indeed,	 such	 a	 conception	of	 universalism,	which	 takes	 shape	and	 content	 from	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 struggles	 and	 is	 conceived	 as	 constantly	 forming,	constantly	 open	 to	 challenge,	 constantly	 capable	 of	 renewal	 thanks	 to	 solidarity	 (Arruzza,	Bhattacharya,	 Fraser,	 2019),	 can	 inspire	 not	 only	 the	 struggle	 for	 rights	 but	 also	 political	action	which,	 instead	of	breaking	 apart	 into	multiple	 identity-based	demands,	 identifies	 the	common	 objectives	 to	 be	 pursued.	 It	 could	 weave	 broad	 alliances,	 even	 temporary	 ones,	because,	 as	 Martha	 Fineman	 (2008,	 p.	 17)	 has	 argued:	 “it	 is	 not	 multiple	 identities	 that	intersect	to	produce	compounded	inequalities	(…),	but	rather	systems	of	power	and	privilege	that	interact	to	produce	webs	of	advantages	and	disadvantages.”		
Conclusions		I	close	this	short	essay	written	mainly	in	the	summer	2019	by	looking	out	over	the	sea.	A	few	days	ago	the	world's	 largest	sailing	ship	appeared	on	the	horizon:	built	at	a	cost	of	460	million	dollars,	 is	143	metres	 long	and	has	8	bridges	connected	by	 lifts,	a	helicopter	 landing	strip,	a	gymnasium,	a	spa,	a	swimming	pool	and	a	glass	room	for	underwater	observation.	It	belongs	 to	 a	 person	 about	 my	 age,	 the	 Russian	 billionaire	 Andrei	 Melnichenko.	 He	 has	appeared	 on	 Forbes’	 list	 of	 the	world’s	 100	 richest	men	 thanks	 to	 his	 13	 billion	 dollars	 in	asserts	 accumulated	 through	 investments	 first	 in	 the	 fertilizer	 sector	 and	 later	 in	 the	 coal	industry.	The	beachgoers	look	on	this	sea	monster	in	admiration,	while	they	express	anger	at	the	 'unacceptable	 challenge'	 that	 German	 activist	 Carola	 Rackete,	 captain	 of	 the	 ship	 Sea	Watch,	 posed	 to	 the	 Italian	 Minister	 of	 the	 Interior	 when	 she	 landed	 in	 Lampedusa	 to	disembark	 a	 few	 dozen	 migrants	 saved	 from	 the	 waters	 of	 this	 same	 Mediterranean	 Sea.	Social	 envy	 is	 directed	 downwards	 and	 strikes	 desperate	 people.	 Those	 who	 still	 have	 the	ability	to	raise	their	gaze	also	have	the	duty	to	strive	to	transform	this	envy	by	relaunching	the	values	of	equality	and	solidarity.	And	not	only	 in	words,	but	also	through	practices	of	“care”	acted	out	in	daily	life,54	without	which	there	can	be	neither	liberal	democracy	nor	the	rule	of	law.			
																																								 																				53	In	keeping	with	the	approach	at	the	heart	of	critical	theories,	specifically	feminist	theory.	Regarding	critical	legal	theories,	see	Bernardini,	Giolo	(2018).	54	Recently,	in	a	series	of	conferences	held	in	Italy,	Joan	Tronto	(2013)	argued	that	the	popularity	of	neopopulism	–	and	we	could	add,	 the	widespread	 support	 for	 new	nationalisms	–	 can	be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 request	 for	 “care”,	 in	 the	 sense	 theorized	by	 the	author	of	Caring	Democracy	(2013)	that	takes	on	a	defensive	twist.	The	antidote	to	these	stances	should	therefore	be	sought	in	"care"	 policies	 and	 practices	 effective	 in	 combatting	 impoverishment	 and	 social	 disintegration,	 encouraging	 participation	 in	democracy	as	a	common	good.	These	are	not	only	welfare	policies	but	also	daily	actions	such	as	cultural	and	social	activities,	even	small	 ones,	 organized	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 overcoming	 atomization	 and	 identity	 closure	 (see	 http://www.iaphitalia.org/caring-democratically-a-response-to-neopopulism-joan-tronto/,	last	accessed	3	August	2019)	
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